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I.

INTRODUCTION

The current European Union (“EU”) copyright framework, a set of
approximately ten directives,1 is governed principally by Directive
2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001
on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the
information society (“InfoSoc Directive”). With this governing piece of
legislation “adopted before Facebook and YouTube even existed,”
Europeans have found the rules “too inflexible to be adaptable to new forms
of using cultural works.”2 For instance, companies providing digital
copyright content—such as Netflix or Google Play—must license their
services on a country-by-country basis.3 Frequently, companies that hold a
license in one country do not hold a license to provide the same content in
another EU country.4 As a result, Europeans are often blocked from
accessing online content depending on their geographic location.5
Recognizing the need to modernize the copyright framework “in light of the
digital revolution and changed consumer behavior,”6 the European
Parliament tasked Member of the European Parliament (“MEP”) rapporteur
Julia Reda with drafting legislation to guide the European Commission in
conforming EU copyright law to the digital age. Toward that end, Parliament
adopted European Parliament Resolution of 9 July 2015 on the
Implementation of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of

1. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Towards a Modern, More
European Copyright Framework, at 3 n.4, COM (2015) 0626 (Dec. 9, 2015) [hereinafter
Communication].
2. Zachary Davies Boren, Pirate Party: “We are Literally Rewriting EU Copyright Law, THE
INDEPENDENT (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/pirateparty-we-are-literally-rewriting-eu-copyright-law-9958982.html.
3. Nicholas Hirst, Cross-Border Content Complications, POLITICO (May 2, 2014),
http://www.politico.eu/article/cross-border-content-complications/.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Digital Single Market Strategy for
Europe, at 2, COM (2015) 192 final (May 6, 2015) [hereinafter Digital Single Market Strategy].
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the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society (“Resolution”).7
Although non-binding, the Resolution effectively sets forth
Parliament’s position on pivotal issues facing EU copyright law and calls
upon the European Commission to consider or adopt a score of its
recommendations thereon. Responding in part, the Commission has already
submitted a proposed regulation regarding cross-portability of online content
services8 and a communication further outlining how it plans on achieving
“a more modern, more European copyright framework.”9
With the Commission set to propose further legislation modernizing the
copyright regime that Parliament and the Council of the European Union
may then adopt as binding EU-wide law, the Resolution’s significance is
clear and warrants analysis.10 While not without its merits, the Resolution is
certainly not without its shortcomings. By taking inconsistent positions on
territoriality, geo-blocking and contractual relations between right holders,
urging a reduction in the duration of copyright protection, and failing to
request legislation establishing a single European copyright title, the
Resolution and subsequent legislation complicate the copyright regime
which Parliament and the Council have a duty to resolve via a single
European copyright title.
Toward that end, Section II of this article will summarize and identify
the ramifications of the InfoSoc Directive, which prompted the Resolution
and anticipated copyright reform in Europe. Sections III and IV will identify
and analyze the Resolution’s merits and shortcomings, respectively. These
sections will also identify any issues the Commission has subsequently
addressed via its Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council on Ensuring the Cross-Border Portability of Online Content
Services in the Internal Market (“Proposal”) or communication titled
Towards a Modern, More European Copyright Framework
(“Communication”) and provide analysis thereof. Section V will argue that
Parliament and the Council have a duty to resolve the issues raised by the
7. See generally European Parliament Resolution of 9 July 2015 on the Implementation of
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the
Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2015 O.J.
(C 265) [hereinafter Resolution].
8. See generally Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council to
Ensure the Cross-Border Portability of Online Content Services in the Internal Market, EUR. PARL. DOC.
(COM 627) (2015) [hereinafter Proposal].
9. Communication, supra note 1, at 2.
10. Copyright Reform: Promote Cultural Diversity and Ensure Access to it, Say MEPs, EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT
NEWS
(July
9,
2015),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/newsroom/content/20150703IPR73903/html/Copyright-reform-promote-cultural-diversity-and-ensureaccess-to-it-say-MEPs.
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Resolution, Proposal and Communication via a single European copyright
title. Finally, Section VI will conclude by summarizing the arguments made
in previous sections then identifying the pros of establishing a single
European copyright title.
II.

BACKGROUND

In late June of 1994, on the Greek island of Corfu, the European Council
resolved to “create a general and flexible legal framework at Community
level in order to foster the development of the information society in
Europe.”11 Copyright law, therefore, needed to be “adapted and
supplemented to respond adequately to economic realities such as new forms
of exploitation” brought about by the digital revolution.12 Toward that end,
and to implement the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright
Treaty, Parliament and the Council adopted the InfoSoc Directive in 2001
with the dual purpose of harmonizing the legal framework on copyright to
thereby increase legal certainty.13 Despite these lofty intentions, the InfoSoc
Directive actuated legal calamity, the chief culprits of which are Articles 5
and 6.
A. Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive
Article 5 enunciates a host of exceptions and limitations that Member
States14 may, but are not obligated to, adopt.15 The permissive nature of these
exceptions and limitations allows Member States to cherry-pick exceptions
and limitations as they see fit. Not surprisingly, different Member States
have adopted different exceptions and limitations, so what may be legal in
one country may be illegal in another.16 For example, Article 5, Section 3(h)
allows Member States to provide an exception or limitation for “use of

11. Directive 2001/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the
Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J.
(L 167) 10 [hereinafter Directive 2001/29/EC].
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Member States are those nations that are members of the European Union: Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Countries, EUROPA (Jan. 25, 2016),
http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm.
15. Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 10, at art. 5 §§ 2–4.
16. Eleonora Rosati, EU Parliament Rejects Restrictions on Freedom of Panorama and Ancillary
Right Over News Content, THE IPKAT (July 9, 2015), http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2015/07/euparliament-rejects-restrictions-on.html.
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works, such as works of architecture or sculpture, made to be located
permanently in public places,” otherwise known as the freedom of panorama
exception.17 While most Member States provide for freedom of panorama in
some form, many do not and the map below depicts this incongruity.18
Countries with complete freedom of panorama are green; countries that limit
freedom of panorama to buildings are light green; countries where freedom
of panorama exists only for non-commercial use of photos of public artworks
are yellow; and, finally, countries devoid of freedom of panorama altogether
are red:

19

17. Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 10, at art. 5 § 3(h).
18. Julia Reda, Freedom of Panorama Under Threat, JULIA REDA (June 22, 2015),
https://juliareda.eu/2015/06/fop-under-threat/.
19. Id.
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At first blush, these laws may appear problematic only to professional
photographers or videographers, but to hold so would be remiss. To
understand how these laws have the potential to affect the average European
and tourist alike, consider the following example. In France, as in the United
States, architectural works are copyrightable subject matter and therefore
protected for the life of the author, plus seventy years.20 If the term of
protection has not expired and thereby placed the work within the public
domain, reproductions of such works require consent of the current right
holder.21 Tourists rejoice, for the 125-year-old Eiffel Tower is well within
the public domain and so may be freely photographed or sketched—but only
before its lights go on.22 As it were, a special lighting design was installed in
1989 to commemorate the tower’s 100th anniversary which the Cour de
Cassation held in 1992 was an “original ‘visual creation’” protected by
copyright.23 Commercial use of a photograph of the Eiffel Tower at night
therefore requires prior authorization by the Société d’Exploitation de la
Tour Eiffel (“SETE”), the organization that operates the tower.24
Considering, however, the vast majority of people visiting the Eiffel
Tower are unlikely to offer their photographs of the tower commercially, one
may wonder how laws restricting the freedom of panorama actually affect
the average European or tourist. To put it simply, the trouble occurs when
those photographs are posted on social media platforms such as Facebook.
By agreeing to Facebook’s Terms of Service, users permit Facebook to use
their “name, profile picture, content, and information in connection with
commercial . . . content.”25 Assent to Facebook’s terms also means users
agree to “not post content . . . that infringes or violates someone else’s
rights.”26 Posting on Facebook a photograph of the Eiffel Tower illuminated
at night without SETE’s prior authorization thus turns what would otherwise
be a noncommercial use into a commercial use and thereby violates SETE’s
copyright, as well as Facebook’s Terms of Service.

20. Compare Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle [Intellectual Property Code] arts. L112-2 and
L123-1 [hereinafter French Intellectual Property Code], with U.S. Copyright Code, 17 U.S.C. § 102
(1990).
21. French Intellectual Property Code, supra note 19, at art. L122-4.
22. Steve Schlackman, Do Night Photos of the Eiffel Tower Violate Copyright?, ART LAW
JOURNAL (Nov. 16, 2014), http://artlawjournal.com/night-photos-eiffel-tower-violate-copyright/.
23. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Mar. 3, 1992, Bull. civ.
I, No. 90-18081 (Fr.) (“les formes du monument constituait une ‘création visuelle’ originale”) [“the forms
of the monument constituted an original ‘visual creation’”].
24. Filming
and
Image
Shots—Professionals,
TOUREIFFEL.PARIS,
http://www.toureiffel.paris/en/the-eiffel-tower-image-and-brand/filming-at-the-eiffel-tower.html.
25. Terms of Service, § 9.1, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php.
26. Id. § 5.1.
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Aside from allowing Member States to enact such odd laws with respect
to freedom of panorama, the optional nature of Article 5 of the InfoSoc has,
above all, needlessly created legal uncertainty. Because most Member States
are only a few hours away by train from each other, it is entirely possible for
Europeans and tourists alike to find themselves in two, perhaps three,
separate Member States in a single day—some of which may provide for
freedom of panorama, some of which may not. To continue with the Eiffel
Tower example above, someone who takes a photograph of the Eiffel Tower
at night could travel through France and Belgium, into the Netherlands and
end up in Amsterdam photographing the “I amsterdam” letters just three
hours and twenty minutes later.27 During this relatively short time, the
photographer would be confronted with antithetical legal systems: the
Netherlands affords complete freedom of panorama, whereas France and
Belgium do not.28 Likely unbeknownst to him, the photographer’s pictures
of the Eiffel Tower may thus expose him to liability for copyright
infringement while his pictures of the “I amsterdam” letters are protected by
the freedom of panorama. With such laws that only those familiar with the
nuances of copyright law are likely to be aware of, but all are affected by,
the InfoSoc Directive missed the mark with regard to providing legal
certainty.
B. Article 6 of the InfoSoc Directive
Unlike Article 5, however, Article 6 requires Member States to provide
protections against circumvention of technological protection measures for
copyrighted works.29 Article 6(1) states that “Member States shall provide
adequate legal protection against the circumvention of any effective
technological measures, which the person concerned carries out in the
knowledge, or with reasonable grounds to know, that he or she is pursuing
that objective.”30
Because “circumvention usually takes place by means of a device,”31
Article 6(2) requires Member States to:
provide adequate legal protection against the manufacture,
import, distribution, sale, rental, advertisement for sale or
27. Eurail Map of Train Routes in Europe, EURAIL.COM, http://www.eurail.com/plan-yourtrip/railway-map#traveltime.
28. Reda, supra note 17.
29. See generally Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 10, at art. 6.
30. Id. at art. 6(1).
31. Alvise M. Casellati, The Evolution of Article 6.4 of the European Information Society
Copyright Directive, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 369, 377 (2001).
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rental, or possession for commercial purposes of devices,
products or components or the provision of services which:
(a) are promoted, advertised or marketed for the
purpose of circumvention of, or
(b) have only a limited commercially significant
purpose or use other than to circumvent, or
(c) are primarily designed, produced, adapted or
performed for the purpose of enabling or facilitating the
circumvention of, any effective technological measures.32
Recognizing that such requirements may infringe upon the so-called
“public policy exceptions” of Article 5,33 e.g., those regarding photocopying,
copy and archive purposes of educational facilities, broadcaster’s own
ephemeral recordings, non-commercial broadcasts, teaching and research,
use by disabled individuals, and public safety,34 Article 6(4) subparagraph 1
requires Member States to also take measures to ensure that the public is not
denied the benefit of those exceptions by the protective measures mandated
by Article 6(1) and (2).35 It is interesting to note that despite the permissive
nature of Article 5, Article 6(4) subparagraph 1 requires Member States to
take such measures and therefore turns these permissive exceptions into
mandatory exceptions in all Member States. Similarly, although not
required, Article 6(4) subparagraph 2 allows Member States to take measures
to ensure that beneficiaries of the private copying exception delineated in
Article 5(b)(2) are not denied the benefit of that exception by Article 6(1)
and (2).36
Apparently anticipating, but perhaps underestimating, the rise of videoon-demand services and the need to protect such markets, the Commission
added Article 6(4) subparagraph 4, which states: “[t]he provisions of the first
and second subparagraphs shall not apply to the works or other subjectmatter made available to the public on agreed contractual terms in such a
way that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time
individually chosen by them.”37 Simply put, EU copyright law does not

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 10, at art. 6(2).
Id. at arts. 5(2)(a), (2)(c), (2)(d), (2)(e), (3)(a), (3)(b) and (3)(e).
See id. at art. 5
Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 10, at art. 6(4), ¶ 1.
Id. at art. 6(4), ¶ 2.
Id. at art. 6(4), ¶ 4.
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require Member States to do anything to ensure that parties to contracts
providing on-demand access to copyright works like Netflix are actually able
to access those works. This subparagraph, therefore, establishes that
copyright exceptions are not applicable to on-demand services and that
contract law controls such services. What is troublesome about this, though,
is that companies providing on-demand services typically license their
services on a country-by-country basis.38 Frequently, these companies do not
hold licenses in every Member State which means many Europeans are often
blocked from accessing content they pay for when visiting other countries.
Because geo-restrictions are generally written into service agreements,39
Europeans have no legal basis to challenge these restrictions. As a result,
many Europeans resolve to circumvent such restrictions through virtual
private networks (“VPN’s”).40 VPN’s allow users to disguise their IP address
so that it appears as if they are in a country that is licensed to access the
content41 and, as it stands, approximately twenty percent of European users
use them to access digital content.42 Ironically, by adopting Article 6(4)
subparagraph 4 the Commission instigated the type of circumvention that the
same article aimed at preventing. As Vice-President of the European
Commission Andrus Ansip noted, “[European] legislation is pushing people
to steal.”43
As the examples above demonstrate, the InfoSoc Directive has created
legal discord among Member States and is ill equipped for a post-digital
revolution society. Fortunately, legislation to harmonize and conform
European copyright law to the digital age is already underway with the
Commission’s Digital Single Market Strategy and Parliament’s Resolution,
the latter of which will be analyzed and evaluated below.
III.

MERITS OF RESOLUTION

Although the Resolution is not binding, it does present Parliament’s
position on several pivotal issues facing the EU copyright regime. As such,
it will undoubtedly inform the Commission in drafting legislation to update
copyright law to the digital age and, at the very least, indicates what will be
38. Hirst, supra note 3.
39. Terms of Use, § 6(c), NETFLIX, https://www.netflix.com/TermsOfUse.
40. Andrew Tarantola, VPNs: What They Do, How They Work, and Why You’re Dumb for Not
Using One, GIZMODO (Mar. 26, 2013), http://gizmodo.com/5990192/vpns-what-they-do-how-theywork-and-why-youre-dumb-for-not-using-one (defining VPN’s); see also Andy, EU: Copyright
Legislation is Pushing People to Piracy, TORRENTFREAK (June 9, 2015), https://torrentfreak.com/eucopyright-legislation-is-pushing-people-to-piracy-150609/.
41. Tarantola, supra note 40.
42. Andy, supra note 40.
43. Id.
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important to Parliament when voting on that legislation. It is therefore
appropriate to analyze and evaluate the Resolution, as well as to consider its
ramifications.
Notwithstanding the shortcomings discussed infra, the Resolution
laudably advocates for several significant changes in the EU copyright
regime. Among the Resolution’s noteworthy merits are its preservation of
freedom of panorama, cognizance of consumers’ rights, and requests for new
exceptions and limitations.
A. Freedom of Panorama
“Freedom of panorama is the unrestricted right to use photographs of
public spaces, without infringing [upon] the rights of the architect or the
visual artist.”44
This right is permitted under Article 5(3)(h) of the InfoSoc Directive
which states Member States may provide an exception for the “use of works,
such as works of architecture or sculpture, made to be located permanently
in public places.”45 Most Member States have adopted such an exception
thereby providing for freedom of panorama, but Belgium, France, Greece,
Italy and Luxembourg have not.46 To harmonize the EU in this regard,
Paragraph 16 of Julia Reda’s Draft Report “calls on the EU legislator to
ensure that the use of photographs, video footage or other images of works
which are permanently located in public places is permitted.”47 Members of
the European People’s Party, Socialists and Liberals on the legal affairs
committee rejected this proposal and amended the report to read: “Considers
that the commercial use of photographs, video footage or other images of
works which are permanently located in physical public places should
always be subject to prior authorisation from the authors or any proxy acting
for them.”48 Recalling the map above, this amendment would turn all green
44. Jimmy Wales, If You Want to Keep Sharing Photos for Free, Read This, THE GUARDIAN (July
3,
2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jul/03/sharing-photos-freedom-ofpanorama.
45. Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 10, at art. 5(3)(h).
46. Freedom of Panorama in Europe in 2015, WIKIMEDIA (July 4, 2015),
https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Freedom_of_Panorama_in_Europe_in_2015/Learn_more; see also
Reda, supra note 18.
47. Draft Report on the Implementation of Directive 2001/21/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights
in
the
Information
Society
(2014/2256(INI)),
at
6
(Jan.
15,
2015),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE546.580+02+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.
48. Amendments 281–556 Draft Report on the Implementation of Directive 2001/21/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of
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and light green countries either yellow or red.49 This would mean freedom
of panorama would extend only to publication of photos of public artworks
for noncommercial purposes or the freedom would not exist at all.50
Fortunately, European citizens rallied in opposition to the amendment
and it was subsequently dropped from the final draft of the Resolution.51 The
freedom of panorama, then, will remain where it is presently envisaged—at
least for now. As the Communication reports, the Commission “will consider
legislative proposals on [] EU exceptions by spring 2016” in order to clarify
certain exceptions.52 Specifically, the Communication expresses the need to
“clarify the current EU exception” regarding freedom of panorama.53 While
some have criticized the Commission for not demonstrating a firm
“commitment to a strong exception for Freedom of Panorama,” it is unlikely
the Commission will fail to do so in the coming proposals given the outpour
of public opposition during the drafting stage of the Resolution in the
summer of 2015.54 Indeed, the Communication’s acknowledgement of the
importance of freedom of panorama to Europeans constitutes “a step in the
right direction.”55 As this section of the Communication is the “likely
consequence” of the Resolution, the Resolution is commendable in that it
has had a positive influence on the Commission.56
B. Consumers’ Rights and Geo-blocking
European copyright theory is underpinned by the droit d’auteur
(author’s right) tradition, which focuses on the moral rights of the author
rather than on the rights of consumers or other right holders.57 Interestingly,
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society (2014/2256(INI)), at 70 (Mar. 5, 2015),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=COMPARL&reference=PE549.469&format=PDF&language=EN&secondRef=01.
49. Reda, supra note 18.
50. Id.
51. Nevena Kostova, The EU Copyright Reform Debate is Marked by Diverging Views, EUROPEAN
FUTURES (July 28, 2015), http://www.europeanfutures.ed.ac.uk/article-1359.
52. Communication, supra note 1, at 8.
53. Id.
54. Paul Keller, Leaked Copyright Communication: A More Modern Copyright Framework for
Europe?, COMMUNIA (Nov. 6, 2015), http://www.communia-association.org/2015/11/06/leakedcopyright-communication-a-more-modern-copyright-framework-for-europe/.
55. Jorge Castro, European Commission Copyright Action Plan: A Busy 2016, CTR. DEMOCRACY
& TECH. (Dec. 10, 2015), https://cdt.org/blog/european-commission-copyright-action-plan-a-busy2016/.
56. Id.
57. Rainer Kuhlen, Copyright Issues in the European Union—Towards a Science—and
Education—Friendly Copyright, INSTITUTIONAL REPOSITORY UNIV. KONSTANZ 1, 2 (Mar. 5, 2013),
http://kops.unikonstanz.de/bitstream/handle/123456789/27083/Kuhlen_270834.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
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however, paragraphs 59 and 67 specifically stress the importance of
“consumers’ rights.”58 This shift away from the strictly author’s rights
centered copyright regime is also reflected in the Resolution’s treatment of
geo-blocking, which often prevents Europeans from accessing digital
content depending on their geographic location. With the Resolution’s
drafter, Julia Reda, opining that “this video is not available in your country’
message must be a thing of the past,” it is no surprise the issue is repeatedly
touched on in the final version of the Resolution.59 Indeed, paragraph 9
points out “that consumers are too often denied access to certain content
services on geographical grounds, which runs counter to the objective of [the
InfoSoc Directive] of implementing the four freedoms of the internal
market.”60 The Resolution in paragraph 11 also “[s]tresses” that the creative
output of the EU is one of its richest resources, and those who want to enjoy
it should be able to pay to do so, even when it is only sold in another Member
State.”61 The Resolution, therefore, urges the Commission “to propose
adequate solutions for better cross-border accessibility of services and
copyright content for consumers.”62 Toward that end, the Resolution also
expresses support for the Commission’s Digital Single Market Strategy
adopted May 6, 2015.63 By advocating for consumers’ rights to access
content, the Resolution marks a much needed shift from the largely authorcentered copyright framework towards a system that recognizes that, in the
information society, consumers also have rights with regard to copyright
materials.
Because approximately twenty percent of European internet users
employ VPN’s to circumvent geo-blocking measures, creators are losing “a
huge amount of money.”64 Preventing geo-blocking, therefore, would put
that money back into the pockets of creators, providers, and other rights
holders. As alluded to in paragraph 11 of the Resolution, by preventing geoblocking, digital content providers would also have access to larger markets
and may therefore increase capital. It is clear, therefore, that preventing geoblocking is not only in the best interest of European consumers, but also in
the best interest of creators, providers, or other right holders. The Resolution

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Resolution, supra note 7, ¶¶ 59, 67.
Boren, supra note 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Resolution, supra note 7, ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id. ¶ 9.
See id. ¶¶ 3, 20, 23, 24.
Andy, supra note 39.
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thus calls for a win-win situation for all those interested and for that it is
commendable.
However, the Resolution deserves praise for another reason. Just five
months after the Resolution was published, the Commission acted on
Parliament’s call for legislation to address the issue of geo-blocking and
submitted its Proposal for a regulation ensuring the cross-border portability
of online content services.65 While a close analysis of the Proposal will be
presented below, it is enough for now to note that it requires service
providers to allow subscribers “temporarily present in a Member State to
access and use the online content service.”66 The Proposal therefore marks
the Commission’s first move to combat the deleterious practice of geoblocking as requested in the Resolution. This move is undoubtedly a step in
the right direction, and its effect was immediate with Netflix representatives
commenting, “[w]e” are committed to providing Netflix members with great
programming wherever they are and are studying the EU’s proposal.”67
C. Exceptions and Limitations
Recognizing that the optional nature of the twenty-one exceptions and
limitations laid out in Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive has created vast
discrepancies between Member States’ copyright regimes, the Resolution
points out “some exceptions and limitations may therefore benefit from more
common rules.”68 The Resolution therefore appropriately calls upon the
Commission “to examine the application of minimum standards across the
exceptions and limitations.”69 The Resolution also asks the Commission to
review existing exceptions and limitations “in order to better adapt them to
the digital environment.”70 As harmonization and modernization of the
copyright regime works towards the goals of the internal market, these
propositions are certainly praiseworthy.
The Resolution is also meritorious in that it calls for the creation of
numerous exceptions to address obstacles brought about by the digital
revolution as follows:

65. See generally Proposal, supra note 8.
66. Id. art. 3(1).
67. Kevin Rawlinson, Netflix and Other Services to Be Available on Holiday, BBC NEWS (Dec. 9,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-35051054.
68. Resolution, supra note 7, ¶ 37.
69. Id. ¶ 38.
70. Id. ¶ 35.
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Paragraph 51 calls for an exception for online and
cross-border activities for research and education purposes;
Paragraph 53 calls upon the Commission to consider
adopting an e-lending exception “allowing public and
research libraries to legally lend works to the public in
digital formats for personal use;” and
Paragraph 54 asks the Commission to consider
adopting an exception digitalize their collections for
consulting, cataloging and archiving purposes.71
Providing for such exceptions will allow institutions to effectively
fulfill their “public interest duty of disseminating knowledge . . . in an up-todate manner.”72 Keeping with the droit d’auteur tradition, the Resolution
asks for fair remuneration for right holders with regard to digital distribution
of their works which seems to strike an appropriate balance between the
public interest in accessing works conveniently and right holders’ interests
in compensation for those works.73
The Resolution deserves praise not only for calling on the Commission
to provide for such exceptions, but also for instigating the Commission to
actually make such changes. The Communication notes that the Commission
will “consider legislative proposals” that will clarify the scope of the
exception for digital modes of teaching illustrations, “support remote
consultation” of library works for academic purposes, and balance the needs
of cultural heritage institutions and the needs of “born-digital and digitised
works.”74 As is clear, the Resolution is directly responsible for bringing
these important issues to the Commission’s attention and prompting it to
determine legislative solutions.

IV.

SHORTCOMINGS OF RESOLUTION

Although the Resolution makes great strides with regard to modernizing
European copyright law for the contemporary digital, information society, it
is not without its shortcomings. The Resolution warrants criticism for
breaching its duty to promote a clear legal framework for copyright law,
advocating for a reduction in the duration of copyright protection, and failing
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. ¶¶ 51, 53, 54.
Id. ¶ 53.
See generally Copyright Reform, supra note 10.
Communication, supra note 1, at 8.
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to make a stronger statement on establishing a single European copyright
title.
A. Duty to Promote a Clear Legal Framework
Paragraph Q of the Resolution relates that “EU legislative authorities
have a duty to promote a clear legal framework for copyright and related
rights that can be understood by all stakeholders, in particular the general
public, and that ensures legal certainty.”75 The Resolution, however, fails to
satisfy this duty, and in fact creates legal uncertainty, by reaffirming the
principle of territoriality with regard to copyright law as well as taking
inconsistent stances on geo-blocking and freedom of contract.
1. The Principle of Territoriality
Most troublesome about providing legal certainty is the Resolution’s
affirmation of the principle of territoriality.76 The principle of territoriality
holds that copyright laws should be determined on a country-by-country
basis because rights are “acquired and enforced on a country-by-country
basis.”77 The extent to which this principle should be applied to the EU
copyright framework in light of the internal market will be discussed below
in Section V. For now, though, it is enough to note that although there has
been some EU wide harmonization, copyright and related rights remain
territorial. The supposed territorial nature of copyright law has thus led
legislators to leave it up to Member States to decide which exceptions and
limitations they see fit given their individual cultural values and legal
traditions. So, on one hand, the legislature has a duty to provide clarity and
harmonization, and, on the other, the legislature must respect Member
States’ cultural diversity.78 The optional nature of the exceptions and
limitations enunciated in Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive, then, evidences
a clear attempt by the Commission, Parliament and Council to balance these
two duties. However, these two duties are not always compatible with each
other. For example, the optional nature of the twenty-one exceptions or
limitations allowed for under Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive means there

75.
76.
77.

Resolution, supra note 7, ¶ Q.
Id. ¶ 6 (the “existence of copyright and related rights inherently implies territoriality”).
Tambiama A. Madiega, EU Copyright Reform: Revisiting the Principle of Territoriality,
EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENTARY
RESEARCH
SERVICES
(Sept.
28,
2015),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/568348/EPRS_BRI(2015)568348_EN.pdf.
78. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 151,
2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
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are 2,097,152 different ways Article 5 may be implemented.79 Clearly,
harmony took a backseat to cultural diversity in the InfoSoc Directive; but,
the shortcomings of the InfoSoc Directive do not excuse the shortcomings of
the Resolution. Rather, the InfoSoc Directive’s shortcomings elevate the
legislature’s duty to provide uniformity because there is such disconformity
among Member States’ copyright regimes. It is inapposite, then, to affirm a
principle which fosters such disharmony.
2. Geo-Blocking & Content Portability
Another consequence of applying the principle of territoriality to
copyright law is that there is not one single European copyright title, but
rather twenty-eight “separate national ones.”80 Copyright owners therefore
must obtain licenses in each Member State before their rights can be
protected in that State. Because it can be “difficult or impossible to obtain”81
licenses in all twenty-eight Member States, many right holders do not hold
licenses in all Member States and are unable to distribute content across the
entire EU.82 Conversely, right holders may restrict the “territorial scope of
licenses granted to service providers” thereby limiting the availability of
those services to particular Member States.83 Service providers themselves
may further confine their services to particular Member States, even if their
licenses permit them to offer those services to a multitude of Member
States.84 Because content is “blocked” from users depending on their
geographic location, these deleterious practices have been dubbed geoblocking.
As noted above, one central goal of the Resolution is to prohibit geoblocking because it interferes with consumers’ rights to content.
Nevertheless, the Resolution sends mixed signals to the Commission on the
issue of geo-blocking, at times denouncing it and at others maintaining its
importance to the audio-visual industry. Consider the following:
Paragraph 9. [C]onsumers are too often denied access
to certain content services on geographical grounds, which
runs counter to the objective of [the InfoSoc Directive] of
implementing the four freedoms of the internal market;
urges the Commission, therefore, to propose adequate
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

FIX COPYRIGHT!, http://www.fixcopyright.eu/.
Communication, supra note 1, at 4 n.14.
Id.
See generally Hirst, supra note 3.
Communication, supra note 1, at 4.
Id.
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solutions for better cross-border accessibility of services and
copyright content for consumers;
Paragraph 11. Stresses that the creative output of the
EU is one of its richest resources, and those who want to
enjoy it should be able to pay to do so, even when it is only
sold in another Member State; and
Paragraph 14. Emphasises that industry geoblocking
practices should not prevent cultural minorities living in EU
Member States from accessing existing content or services
in their language that are either free or paid for.85
In these paragraphs Parliament seems to have recognized and
appreciated the effect of geo-blocking on consumers and pushed for
legislation preventing such practices. The following paragraphs, however,
disclose a contrary attitude towards the practice of geo-blocking:
Paragraph 13. Points out that the financing, production
and co-production of films and television content depend to
a great extent on exclusive territorial licenses . . . that being
so, emphasises that the ability, under the principle of
freedom of contract, to select the extent of territorial
coverage and the type of distribution platform encourages
investment . . . .
Paragraph 17. Takes note of the importance of
territorial licenses in the EU, particularly with regard to
audiovisual and film production which is primarily based on
broadcasters’ pre-purchase or pre-financing systems.86
The Resolution thus rallies against geo-blocking practices while
emphasizing right holders’ ability to contract in such a way as to deny
Europeans audio-visual content on the basis of their geographic location.
Even if the above is nothing more than an innocent inconsistency, it is
nevertheless an inconsistency that is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile.
Such contrary treatment of geo-blocking can hardly be seen as providing
legal clarity; in fact, the Commission’s December 2015 proposal regarding

85.
86.

Resolution, supra note 7, ¶¶ 9, 11, 14.
Id. ¶¶ 13, 17.
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cross-border portability of online content makes it apparent that the
Resolution far from clarified the EU legislature’s position on the subject.87
The Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on Ensuring the Cross-Border Portability of
Online Content Services in the Internal Market (“the Proposal”) marks the
first step of the Commission’s Digital Single Market Strategy.88 As its title
suggests, the Proposal sets forth regulations prohibiting geo-blocking
practices by requiring that online content services be “portable,” meaning
accessible, between Member States. Specifically, Article 3(1) of the Proposal
states that “[t]he provider of an online content service shall enable a
subscriber who is temporarily present in a Member State to access and use
the online content service.”89 Article 2 defines “temporarily present” as the
“presence of a subscriber in a Member State other than the Member State of
residence.”90 The Proposal defines “Member State of residence” as “the
Member State where the subscriber is habitually residing.”91 While the
Proposal is certainly a welcomed improvement towards ridding the EU of
geo-blocking practices, such practices will not thereby be eliminated. As one
commentator notes, “the notion of temporality is defined nowhere.”92 Issues
as to how long or short a stay may be to fall under Article 2(d) will
undoubtedly arise if the Proposal is adopted without the inclusion of clear
temporal restrictions.
Perhaps another consequence of the Resolution’s inconsistent treatment
of geo-blocking is the Proposal’s own inconsistent treatment of geoblocking. The stated goals of the Proposal are “to remove barriers to crossborder portability so that the needs of users can be met more effectively” and
to promote innovation “for the benefit of consumers.”93 Such strong
statements indicate that the Proposal aims to outright prohibit geo-blocking
for the benefit of all consumers, not just those temporarily present in another
Member State. Indeed, the very first paragraph of the Proposal argues
“barriers that hamper access and use of [] online content services cross
87. See generally supra note 8.
88. The Digital Single Market is “one in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and
capital is ensured and where individuals and businesses can seamlessly access and exercise online
activities under conditions of fair competition, and a high level of consumer and personal data protection,
irrespective of their nationality or place of residence.” Digital Single Market Strategy, supra note 6, at 3.
89. Proposal, supra note 8, art. 3(1) (emphasis added).
90. Id. art. 2(d).
91. Id. art. 2(c).
92. Eleonora Rosati, BREAKING: EU Commission Unveils Next Steps for Copyright Reform,
Including Draft Content Portability Regulation, THE IPKAT (Dec. 9, 2015, 11:46 AM),
http://ipkitten.blogspot.it/2015/12/breaking-eu-commission-unveils-next.html.
93. Proposal, supra note 8, at 2.
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border should be eliminated.”94 What is more, the Commission actually
considered a total prohibition on geo-blocking while drafting the Proposal.95
In limiting Article 3(1) to those “temporarily present” in another Member
State, however, the Proposal allows for geo-blocking to continue in Europe.
Specifically, the Proposal fails to provide access to content for those
Europeans that may be in their “Member State of residence” but who wish
to enjoy services that are not accessible in that Member State.
To illustrate the issue, suppose a French citizen, living in France, wants
to subscribe to a British content provider. The content provider, however,
does not have a license to distribute its content in France. Under the narrow
terms of the Proposal, and as a result of the antiquated principle of
territoriality, the French citizen would still be unable to access that content.
Because Europeans in their “Member State of residence” may still be denied
access to content not available in that Member State, geo-blocking will
continue to exist in Europe and will continue to deprive Europeans of a truly
free internal market.
As MEP Julia Reda opined, “geoblocking is a problem that most
adversely affects those who need access to services that aren’t offered in their
home countries . . . .”96 Legislation beyond “roaming for Netflix” is therefore
necessary in order for the four freedoms of the internal market to be fully
realized.97 By failing to take a clear and consistent stance on geo-blocking,
the Resolution sent mixed signals to the Commission. As a result, the
Commission’s Proposal is just as inconsistent as the Resolution, which not
only creates legal uncertainty, but also fails to provide measures that would
effectively eliminate geo-blocking in Europe.
3. Freedom of Contract
Another inconsistency that fails to allow for legal clarity within the
copyright framework is the Resolution’s contradictory stance on the freedom
of contract. Specifically, the Resolution calls for legislation that would
dictate contractual relationships between authors and other right holders but
simultaneously stresses the importance of contractual freedom. For instance,

94. Id. at 10, ¶ 1.
95. Tom Scourfield, Christ Watson & Poonam Majithia, The EU’s Portability proposal—an
attainable step towards a Digital Single Market, LAW-NOW (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.cmslawnow.com/ealerts/2015/12/the-eus-portability-proposal--an-attainable-step-towards-a-digital-singlemarket?cc_lang=en.
96. Julia Reda, End Geoblocking: We Need More than Just Roaming for Netflix!, JULIA REDA (Dec.
9, 2015), https://juliareda.eu/2015/12/more-than-just-roaming-for-netflix/.
97. Id.

56

CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Vol 17:1

the following paragraphs indicate that a chief concern of the Resolution is to
preserve contractual freedom in the digital age:
Paragraph 13. [E]mphasises that the ability, under the
principle of freedom of contract, to select the extent of
territorial coverage, to select the extent of territorial
coverage and the type of distribution platform encourages
investment in films and television content and promotes
cultural diversity.
Paragraph 25. [C]alls for improvements to the
contractual position of authors and performers in relation to
other rightholders and intermediaries . . . as contractual
exchanges may be marked by an imbalance of power;
stresses in this connection the importance of contractual
freedom.98
On the other hand, the Resolution seems to advocate for statutorily
imposed bargaining positions or powers:
Paragraph 24. Deems it indispensable to strengthen the
position of authors and creators and improve their
remuneration with regard to the digital distribution and
exploitation of their works.
Paragraph 25. [C]alls for improvements to the
contractual position of authors and performers in relation
to other rightholders and intermediaries . . . as contractual
exchanges may be marked by an imbalance of power;
stresses in this connection the importance of contractual
freedom.
Paragraph 29. Points out that, in the fragile ecosystem
which produces and finances creative work, exclusive rights
and freedom of contract are key components . . . .
Paragraph 61. [T]he effective exercise of exceptions or
limitations, and access to content that is not subject to
copyright or related rights protection, should not be waived
by contract or contractual terms. 99

98.
99.

Resolution, supra note 7, at ¶¶ 13 and 25 (emphasis added).
Id. at ¶¶ 24, 25, 29, and 61 (emphasis added).
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Stressing the need for authors, creators, and performers to not be “cutout” of the profits of their work certainly shows that Parliament is
sympathetic to groups that are often underrated or undercompensated in the
creative sector and that sentiment is certainly well placed. The problem does
not lie with the Resolution’s intentions, but rather with the language of the
Resolution as a whole. As some commentators have noted, it “seems
contradictory” to statutorily improve the contractual position of creators
while stressing that freedom of contract is a key component of the creative
sector.100 At least facially this argument makes sense: if certain parties are
given greater strength by statute and similar statutes limit the length of
assignments of rights, then the parties are not exactly free to contract
however they want. It hardly needs to be noted, however, that certain
freedoms are not absolute. For instance, freedom of speech may be restricted
in order to respect the rights of others or to protect public order or morals.101
Accordingly, it may simply be that Parliament believes that protecting
authors, creators, and performers by statutorily affording them increased
bargaining power is one such restriction on the freedom of contract.
Whatever the case may be, it remains unclear how Paragraphs 13 and 25 are
supposed to fit in with Paragraphs 24, 25, 29 and 61 and this ambiguity—or,
arguably, this contradiction—further demonstrates that the Resolution failed
to meet its duty of promoting a clear legal framework for European
copyright.
B. Reduction in Duration of Copyright Protection
Another aspect of the Resolution worthy of criticism is its treatment of
the duration of copyright protection. As it stands, the duration of protection
in the EU depends on the type of work for which protection is sought.102
Under Council Directive 93/98/EEC, authors of literary or artistic works
enjoy protection for the life of the author plus seventy years after his or her
death.103 Cinematographic or audiovisual works are similarly protected for

100. Christophe Geiger et al., Reaction of CEIPI to the Resolution on the Implementation of
Directive 2001/29/EC on the Harmonisation of Copyright in the Information Society Adopted by the
European Parliament on the 9th July 2015, CTR. FOR INT’L INTELL. PROP. L., at 5 (July 24, 2015),
http://www.ceipi.edu/fileadmin/upload/DUN/CEIPI/Documents/Etudes/CEIPI_statement_on_EU_copy
right_reform_final-1.pdf.
101. Treaty of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19, Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY
DOC. No. 95-20 (1977), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
102. See generally Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 Harmonizing the Term of
Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 (EC) [hereinafter Directive
93/98/EEC].
103. Id. at art. 1.
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the life of the “principal director” plus seventy years after his or her death.104
The related rights of performers, phonogram producers, and broadcasting
organizations, however, are only protected for fifty years following the date
of the performance or fixation.105
It is interesting to note that when Council Directive 93/98/EEC was
passed in 1993, the duration of copyright protection in the United States was
the life of the author plus fifty years.106 It was argued that American creators
were therefore disadvantaged “vis a vis their European counterparts.”107 As
a result, some authors created artificial “legal domiciles for Europe in order
to gain the benefit of the longer license term.”108 After pressure from
corporate copyright holders, such as Disney to shore up the discrepancy
between the EU and the US, Congress adopted the Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act of 1998 (“CTEA”). The CTEA amended the Copyright
Act of 1976 to increase the duration of copyright protection from the life of
the author plus fifty years to the life of the author plus seventy years.109
Before examining the Resolution, it is important to identify the reasons
Council Directive 93/98/EEC extended the term of copyright protection by
twenty years in the first place. As Paragraph 5 of Council Directive
93/98/EEC notes, the Berne Convention, which laid out minimum standards
of copyright protection in signatory states, set the minimum term of
protection as the life of the author plus fifty years.110 This was “intended to
provide protection for the author and the first two generations of his
descendants.”111 Considering the Berne Convention was originally drafted in
1886, around which time the average person lived to be almost forty-three
years old, affording copyright protection for the life of the author plus fifty
years was sufficient.112 By 1993, however, the average lifespan of Europeans
in 1993 had grown so much that the term set forth in the Berne Convention
was “no longer sufficient to cover two generations.”113 Most significantly,
104. Id. at art. 2.
105. Id. at art. 3.
106. Timothy B. Lee, 15 Years Ago, Congress Kept Mickey Mouse Out of the Public Domain. Will
They Do It Again?, THE WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 25, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2013/10/25/15-years-ago-congress-kept-mickey-mouse-out-of-the-public-domain-will-theydo-it-again/.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105–298, 112 Stat. 2827 §
102(b)(1) (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)).
110. Directive 93/98/EEC, supra note 101, at ¶ 5.
111. Id.
112. See Max Roser, Life Expectancy, OUR WORLD IN DATA (2017), https://ourworldindata.org/lifeexpectancy/#rising-life-expectancy-around-the-world.
113. Directive 93/98/EEC, supra note 101, at ¶ 5.
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the drafters believed that robust copyright protection was necessary to foster
innovation. Paragraph 11 reads:
Whereas in order to establish a high level of protection
which at the same time meets the requirements of the
internal market and the need to establish a legal environment
conducive to the harmonious development of literary and
artistic creation in the Community, the term of protection for
copyright should be harmonized at 70 years after the death
of the author . . . .114
It is clear, then, that the drafter believed that extending the duration of
copyright protection to seventy years after the death of the author was vital
to giving EU copyright holders a high level of protection. Parliament, in
drafting the Resolution, seems to have shared this sentiment, noting at
paragraph 19 that “any reform of the copyright framework should be based
on a high level of protection, since rights are crucial to intellectual creation
and provide a stable, clear and flexible legal base that fosters investment and
growth in the creative and cultural sector.”115
Nonetheless, the Resolution simultaneously “calls on the Commission
to further harmonise the protection of copyright . . . according to the
international standards set out in the Berne Convention.”116 Not only does
such language reveal yet another an internal inconsistency of the Resolution,
but it most importantly runs contrary to a notable goal of the EU copyright
regime. As noted above, the goal of the Berne Convention was to compensate
the author and at least two generations of his decedents.117 To lower the
duration of copyright in an age where the average European lives to be
approximately seventy-eight years old would completely undermine that
goal.118 Furthermore, if the copyright regime “should be based on a high level
of protection,”119 and Council Directive 93/98/EEC specifically noted that a
term of protection extending seventy years after the death of the author is
necessary “in order to establish a high level of protection,”120 it is entirely
contrary to the goals of the EU copyright reform to advocate a reduction in

114. Id. at ¶ 11 (emphasis added).
115. Resolution, supra note 7, at ¶ 19 (emphasis added).
116. Id. at ¶ 32.
117. Directive 93/98/EEC, supra note 101, at ¶ 5.
118. See Average Life Expectancy* in Europe for Those Born in 2017, By Gender and Region (In
Years), STATISTA.COM, http://www.statista.com/statistics/274514/life-expectancy-in-europe/.
119. Resolution, supra note 7, at ¶ 19.
120. Directive 93/98/EEC, supra note 101, at ¶ 5.
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the term of protection. Not only does the Resolution fail to promote a clear
copyright framework in this regard, but also seeks to diminish the rights of
copyright holders and for that the Resolution deserves significant criticism.
C. Single European Copyright Title
A final shortcoming worth pointing out is the Resolution’s lackluster
request for the Commission “to study the impact of a single European
Copyright Title.”121 As will be discussed extensively in Sections V and VI,
such a system is “crucial for the development of a truly European
information society.”122 Accordingly, some commentators have referred to
the Resolution’s rather weak statement on the subject as a “missed
opportunity to make a stronger statement on some essential issues of
copyright law in the EU.”123 Rather than calling on the Commission to
consider the option, it would have been stronger to call on the Commission
to actually establish such a system.
Parliament’s failure to take a more progressive stance with regard to
establishing a single European copyright title is, in turn, reflected in the
Commission’s recent Communication. Because a single European copyright
title “would require substantial changes in the way our rules work today,”
the Commission believes an incremental approach is necessary.124 Thus,
such an incremental approach renders the establishment of a single European
copyright title nothing more than a “long-term vision for copyright in the
EU.”125
It should also be recalled that the whole purpose of the Communication
was to set out “how the Commission intends to achieve the goal of a ‘more
modern, more European copyright framework.’”126 Yet, similar to how the
Resolution merely calls on the Commission to “study the impact”127 of a
single European copyright title, the Communication simply asserts that the
EU “should pursue”128 establishing such a system. Failing to state that it will
pursue a single European copyright title implies that establishing such a
system is not part of the Commission’s plan to achieve a “more modern,

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Resolution, supra note 7, at ¶ 28.
Geiger et al., supra note 99, at 2.
Id.
Communication, supra note 1, at 12.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Resolution, supra note 7, at ¶ 28.
Communication, supra note 1, at 12.
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more European copyright framework.”129 As a result, some commentators
have dismissed this language as nothing more than the Commission’s
attempt to reserve the “right to dream about full copyright harmonisation.”130
Others have also warned that “the Commission’s ‘gradual approach’ to
copyright reform must not retract into a ‘wait-and-see’ one,” fearing that the
Communication “signals diminished momentum from the Commission” to
provide meaningful copyright reform.131 By “tak[ing] into account”132 the
uninspiring language of the Resolution with regard to establishing a single
European copyright title, the Communication relates a similarly uninspiring
position on the subject. The Resolution, therefore, warrants criticism for
failing to make a stronger statement on the subject.
V.

DUTY TO ESTABLISH A SINGLE EUROPEAN
COPYRIGHT TITLE

The principle of conferral, as set forth in Article 5(2) of the Treaty on
European Union (“TEU”), states that the EU legislature may only enact EUwide laws in areas the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(“TFEU”) or TEU (collectively, “the Treaties”) grants it the exclusive
competence to do so and where the law furthers the objectives of the
Treaties.133 Areas where the EU legislature has exclusive competence
include customs union, “common commercial policy,” monetary policy for
Eurozone members,134 common fisheries policy, and “competition rules for
the functioning of the internal market.”135 If the proposed law falls outside
an area in which the EU legislature has exclusive competence, the legislature
may nevertheless share competence with the Member States.136 Shared
competence exists in a number of different areas, the most important to this

129. Id. at 2.
130. Rosati, BREAKING: EU Commission unveils next steps for copyright reform, including draft
content portability regulation, supra note 91.
131. Content Portability proposal encouraging, but greater ambition required to modernize
copyright, EUROISPA (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.euroispa.org/content-portability-proposalencouraging-greater-ambition-required-modernise-copyright/.
132. Communication, supra note 1, at 3.
133. Ana Ramalho, Conceptualizing the European Union’s Competence in Copyright – What Can
the EU Do?, 45 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 178, 178–179 (2014); see Consolidated Version of the
Treaty on European Union art. 5, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13 [hereinafter TEU].
134. Eurozone members are those Member States whose currency is the euro: Austria, Belgium,
Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. See The Euro, EUROPEAN UNION (Jan.
6, 2016), https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/money/euro_en#euro.
135. TFEU, supra note 78, at art. 3.
136. Id. at art. 4.
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analysis being the functioning of the internal market.137 In such a case, the
EU legislature must satisfy two other principles before the law can be
enacted.138 First, the law must not offend the principle of subsidiarity,
meaning the law’s objectives “cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States” or are “better achieved at Union level.”139 Next, the law
must “not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the
Treaties.”140 This rule is known as the principle of proportionality.141
Thus, in order to establish that the EU legislature has a duty to enact a
single European copyright title, it must be shown that the EU legislature has
the necessary competence to do so and that Union level action will further
the objectives of the Treaties.
A. Competence Under Article 118 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union
The principal goal of the Treaty of Rome was to establish political unity
via economic equality.142 For economic equality to exist, there must be an
internal market, meaning “an area without internal frontiers in which the free
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured.”143 Because
intellectual property encompasses both goods and services, Article 118 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) states that:
In the context of the establishment and functioning of
the internal market, the European Parliament and the
Council, acting in accordance with ordinary legislative
procedure, shall establish measures for the creation of
European intellectual property rights to provide uniform
protection of intellectual property rights throughout the
Union and for the setting up of centralised Union-wide
authorisation,
coordination
and
supervision
arrangements.144

137. Id.
138. TEU, supra note 132, at art. 5.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. The
EU
Common
Market,
EUROPEDIA,
http://www.europedia.moussis.eu/books/Book_2/3/6/index.tkl?all (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
143. TFEU, supra note 78, at art. 26.
144. Id. at art. 118 (emphasis added).
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Although the Treaties do not expressly grant the EU legislature with
exclusive competence over copyright,145 Article 118 clearly grants to it
competence over intellectual property rights.146 Because copyright is a form
of intellectual property,147 it follows that Article 118 provides the EU
legislature competence over copyright. It remains unclear from the language
of the statute, however, whether the EU legislature possesses exclusive
competence with respect to intellectual property or merely shares
competence with the Member States. Although the case law resolving this
issue concerns uniform patent protection,148 the decision should extend to
uniform copyright protection as both are simply species of intellectual
property.149
In Joined Cases C-274/11 and C-295/11, Italy and Spain challenged the
Council’s decision to permit twenty-five Member States150 to create a unitary
patent via enhanced cooperation.151 Enhanced cooperation is a power set
forth in Articles 326–334 of the TFEU which allows a minimum of nine
Member States to “establish advanced integration or cooperation . . . without
the other EU countries.”152 The unitary patent system at issue in the joined
cases provides uniform patent protection in all participating Member States
upon registration with the European Patent Office.153 Italy and Spain’s main
contention, however, lied with the language provisions of the unitary patent
system.154 The countries argued that because the system’s official languages
are English, German, and French,155 parties who are not native speakers of

145. Ramalho, supra note 132, at 179.
146. TFEU, supra note 78, at art. 118.
147. See Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-Großmärkte GmbH &
Co. KG, 1971 E.C.R. 487, 492.
148. See Joined Cases C-274/11 & C-295/11, Italian Republic and Kingdom of Spain v. Council of
the European Union, 2013 E.C.R. I-240.
149. Intellectual
Property
Rights,
EUROPA,
http://europa.eu/youreurope/business/startgrow/intellectual-property-rights/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
150. The twenty-five Member States included: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and the
United Kingdom. Joined Cases C-274/11 & C-295/11, 2013 E.C.R. I-240, ¶ 2.
151. Id. ¶ 7.
152. Glossary
of
Summaries:
Enhanced
Cooperation,
EUR-LEX,
http://eurlex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/enhanced_cooperation.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2017); see also TFEU,
supra note 78, at arts. 326–334.
153. Regulation (EU) 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December
2012 Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of the Creation of Unitary Patent Protection, 2012
O.J. (L 361) 1, 4–6.
154. Joined Cases C-274/11 & C-295/11, 2013 E.C.R. I-240, ¶¶ 27–28.
155. Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention), Oct. 7, 1977,
1065 U.N.T.S. 199, 262.
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those languages would be disadvantaged in the prosecution process.156 In
attacking the validity of the unitary patent system, the countries argued that
creation of such a system was within the exclusive competence of the EU
legislature under Article 118 TFEU.157 According to this argument, the
Member States therefore lacked the requisite competence to provide uniform
patent protection and doing so via enhanced cooperation usurped the role of
the legislature.158
The Court of Justice of the European Union began its analysis by noting
that the power, or competence, to provide uniform protection of intellectual
property rights is conferred within “the context of the establishment and
functioning of the internal market” under Article 118 TFEU.159 Because the
functioning of the internal market is an area of shared competence under
Article 4 of the TFEU, the court reasoned that Member States and EU
legislature therefore share competence to provide uniform protection of
intellectual property rights.160 Accordingly, the court held that enhanced
cooperation validly established the unitary patent system.161
Because copyright is a form of intellectual property, Joined Cases C274/11 and C-295/11 established that the EU legislature has shared
competence over copyright. Keeping this in mind, the unambiguous,
prescriptive language of Article 118 becomes extremely significant. It states
that Parliament and the Council “shall” take measures to provide uniform
protection of intellectual property rights, not merely that they “may.”162
Thus, not only does the EU legislature have the power to establish measures
providing uniform protection of intellectual property rights, as a number of
scholars have noted,163 but also an obligation to do so.164 It follows that if
there is not uniform protection of intellectual property rights throughout the

156. Kluwer UPC News Blogger, Despite the Defeat at the CJEU, Spain Will Not Join the Unitary
Patent
System,
KLUWER
PATENT
BLOG
(June
17,
2015),
http://kluwerpatentblog.com/2015/06/17/despite-the-defeat-at-the-cjeu-spain-will-not-join-the-unitarypatent-system/.
157. Joined Cases C-274/11 & C-295/11, 2013 E.C.R. I-240, ¶ 10.
158. Id. ¶¶ 10–11.
159. Id. ¶ 17.
160. Id. ¶¶ 17–19, 25.
161. Id. ¶¶ 24–26.
162. TFEU, supra note 78, at art. 118.
163. See Letter from the European Copyright Society to Gunther Oettinger, Commissioner for
Digital
Econ.
and
Soc’y
(Dec.
19,
2014)
(on
file
at
https://europeancopyrightsocietydotorg.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/ecs_letter_to_oettinger_fin-1.pdf)
[hereinafter E.C.S. Letter]; see also Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright in Europe: Twenty Years Ago, Today
and What the Future Holds, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA AND ENT. L. J. 503, 523 (2013); Geiger
et al., supra note 99, at 7 n.21.
164. See Geiger et al., supra note 99, at 7 n.21.
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EU, then Parliament and the Council must take measures to provide for such
uniformity.
With this in mind, it is important to note that Article 118 TFEU
explicitly states that Parliament and the Council must act “in accordance with
ordinary legislative procedure.”165 Under the “ordinary legislative
procedure,” the Commission submits a proposal that Parliament and the
Council will either approve or amend.166 If necessary, the proposal will go
through a series of amendment procedures, after which Parliament and the
Council will make a final vote either for or against the proposal becoming
EU-wide law.167
Although neither Parliament nor the Council have the ability to draft
legislation on their own initiative,168 Article 225 of the TFEU allows
Parliament to ask the Commission to submit a proposal on any matter
Parliament believes is “required for the purpose of implementing the
Treaties.”169 Accordingly, if there is no uniform protection of intellectual
property rights, Parliament and the Council have a duty to do one of three
things: (1) request the Commission to submit then amend and/or approve any
proposal that provides uniform protection of intellectual property rights; (2)
amend any proposal regarding intellectual property rights so that it provides
uniform protection of said rights and ultimately approve it; or (3) approve
any proposal that provides uniform protection of intellectual rights from the
outset.
As noted above, there are 2,097,152 different ways Article 5 of the
InfoSoc Directive may be implemented.170 Moreover, different Member
States have, in fact, adopted different exceptions and limitations such that
considerable disconformity exists between the copyright regimes of the
twenty-eight Member States.171 To make matters worse, the Resolution—
whose explicit goal was to promote clarity within the copyright regime172—

165. TFEU, supra note 78, at art. 118.
166. Ordinary
Legislative
Procedure
(COD),
EU
MONITOR,
https://www.eumonitor.eu/9353000/1/j9vvik7m1c3gyxp/vga3bya9max9 (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
167. Id.
168. Legislative
Powers,
EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/20150201PVL00004/Legislative-powers.
(last
visited Oct. 23, 2017).
169. TFEU, supra note 78, at art. 225.
170. FIX COPYRIGHT!, supra note 79.
171. For a complete overview of the differences between Member States’ copyright laws, see Guido
Westkamp, Part II: The Implementation of Directive 2001/29/EC in the Member States, QUEEN MARY
INTELL.
PROP.
RES.
INST.,
84–95
(2007),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/studies/infosoc-study-annex_en.pdf.
172. Resolution, supra note 7, ¶ Q.
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is ripe with discrepancies and ambiguities that have already complicated the
EU copyright reform effort by creating similar inconsistencies and
ambiguities in both the Proposal and Communication.
As is clear, uniform copyright protection across the EU does not
currently exist. Therefore, Parliament and the Council have a duty to take
any of the three steps identified above in order to provide uniform copyright
protection. Because the EU legislature’s competence over copyright is
shared with the Member States,173 any measure providing uniform copyright
protection must not offend the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality.174
B. Necessity and Propriety of a Single European
Copyright Title
Because Article 118 TFEU does not specify how uniform protection of
intellectual property rights must be obtained, uniform copyright protection
may be provided by creating a single European copyright title as long as
doing so will not offend the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.175
In other words, it must be shown that EU-wide, rather than national,
legislation is necessary to provide uniform copyright protection and that a
single European copyright title does not “exceed what is necessary” to the
functioning of the internal market.176
1. Principle of Subsidiarity
Under the principle of subsidiarity, EU level action may only be taken
if “the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by
the Member States” or are “better achieved at Union level.”177 The first step,
then, is to identify the objectives a single European copyright title would
serve. As Article 118 TFEU itself reports, the objective of any measure
establishing a European intellectual property right is “to provide uniform
protection of intellectual property rights throughout the Union.”178

173. Joined Cases C-274/11 & C-295/11, 2013 E.C.R. I-240, ¶ 25.
174. TEU, supra note 132, at art. 5.
175. Id.
176. Id.; see TFEU, supra note 78, at art. 4.
177. Article 5(3) states: Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its
exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level,
but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.
TEU, supra note 132, at art. 5.
178. TFEU, supra note 78, at art. 118.

2017

WHY THE DIGITAL AGE DEMANDS A SINGLE EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT TITLE

67

Embedded in Article 118 TFEU, however, is also the underlying objective
to foster the internal market.179 A single European copyright title’s objective,
therefore, must be to provide uniform copyright protection and to further the
internal market.
Next, it must be established that these objectives cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the Member States or are “better achieved at Union level.”180
To begin, over the past twenty-five years, the EU legislature has adopted
approximately ten directives aimed at incrementally harmonizing the
copyright framework.181 While this piecemeal approach has been moderately
successful in providing some minimum standards of copyright protection at
the EU level, it has done so at “considerable expense” as it can often take up
to ten years and vast sums of taxpayers’ money for a directive to be passed,
translated, and transposed by Member States.182 As such, the harmonization
approach is inherently ill equipped to promptly respond to the digital
revolution where a “dynamic information market” is constantly evolving.183
As one commentator has put it, “the harmonisation agenda of the EC has
resulted in an almost non-stop process of amending the national laws on
copyright and related rights.”184
To make matters worse, Member States may not even be amending
national copyright laws in the same way given that Article 5 of the InfoSoc
Directive allows Member States to adopt exceptions and limitations—which
thereby dictate the scope of copyright protection—as they see fit.185 In truth,
the optional nature of Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive has made uniform
copyright protection virtually impossible because Member States have in
fact adopted different exceptions.186 Perhaps the strongest indication that
uniform copyright protection cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member
States is the fact that Member States could have adopted the same exceptions
listed in Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive but did not.
Furthermore, the Resolution and its progeny make the prospect of
uniform copyright protection occurring on the Member States’ own volition

179. Joined Cases C-274/11 & C-295/11, Italian Republic and Kingdom of Spain v. Council of the
European Union, 2013 E.C.R. I-240, ¶ 17; TFEU, supra note 78, at art. 118.
180. TEU, supra note 132, at art. 5.
181. Communication, supra note 1, at 3 n.6.
182. Bernt Hugenholtz et al., The Recasting of Copyright & Related Rights for the Knowledge
Economy,
INST.
FOR
INFO.
LAW,
211
(2006),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/studies/etd2005imd195recast_report_2006.pdf.
183. Id. at 212.
184. Id.
185. Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 11, at art. 5.
186. Westkamp, supra note 170, at 84–94.
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all the more dismal because the ambiguities and discrepancies therein further
muddle the copyright regime and allow for differences in protection amongst
Member States.187 It is true that Member States could propose enhanced
cooperation measures similar to those which established the unitary patent
system, but because participation is voluntary truly uniform protection may
not exist should Member States refuse to participate.188 Given the above,
uniform copyright protection cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member
States. At the very least, the overwhelming success of the Community
Trademark,189 an EU-wide trademark system that allows mark owners to file
a single application and gain uniform protection in all Member States,190
demonstrates that uniform copyright protection would be better achieved at
the Union level.
The EU legislature is similarly better equipped than Member States to
sufficiently achieve the single European copyright title’s second objective of
advancing the internal market. The internal market is “an area without
internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and
capital is ensured.”191 Ideally, the internal market would ensure that
companies are free to “provide or receive services in a Member State other
than the one where the company or consumer is established.”192 However,
“fragmentation and barriers that do not exist” in the physical context have
prevented a digital single market, meaning one where “individuals and
businesses can seamlessly access and exercise online activities . . .
irrespective of their nationality or place of residence,” from thriving.193 For
example, “territoriality has led to fragmentation of markets along national
borderlines” and allowed geo-blocking to become commonplace,
particularly with respect to copyright content.194 Such practices thereby
inhibit the free movement of services and do not advance the internal
market.195 Because removing such artificial restrictions on the free
187. TFEU, supra note 78, at arts. 326–334.
188. Id.
189. Jose Romero & Marcela Dada, A European Success Story, WORLD TRADEMARK REVIEW,
July/Aug. 2006, at 35.
190. See What Is A Community Trademark (CTM)?, ALBRIGHT IP, https://www.albrightip.co.uk/2013/05/what-is-a-community-trademark-ctm/.
191. TFEU, supra note 78, at art. 26.
192. Single Market for Services, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Feb. 11, 2016),
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/services/index_en.htm.
193. Digital Single Market Strategy, supra note 6, at 3.
194. E.C.S. Letter, supra note 162; Mark Walton, EU Hits Sky and Hollywood With Antitrust
Complaint Over Pay-TV Geoblocking, ARS TECHNICA UK (July 23, 2015, 9:23AM),
http://arstechnica.co.uk/tech-policy/2015/07/eu-hits-sky-and-hollywood-with-antitrust-complaint-overpay-tv-geoblocking/.
195. Walton, supra note 193.
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movement of copyright content and services would require cooperation by
each Member State, the EU legislature would best able to achieve the single
European copyright title’s objective of promoting the functioning of the
internal market.
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the single European copyright
title’s dual objectives of providing uniform copyright protection and
furthering the internal market cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member
States and are “better achieved at Union level.”196 Accordingly, the principle
of subsidiarity is not offended and the EU legislature may lawfully unify EU
copyright law provided the principle of proportionality is similarly
unoffended.
2. Principle of Proportionality
The principle of proportionality limits the EU legislature’s power to
“what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.”197 Measures are
deemed disproportionate “only where no objectively defensible
consideration can justify recourse to a specific method intended to attain a
given objective.”198 Other cases have considered measures disproportionate
where they are “manifestly inappropriate . . . to the objective . . . the
competent institution is seeking to pursue.”199 It appears, therefore, that great
deference is given to legislative bodies and only when the means far
outweigh the end objective will a measure violate the principle of
proportionality. Among the objectives of the Treaties are to ensure the
“functioning of the internal market” and to “provide uniform protection of
intellectual property rights throughout the Union.”200 In the context of
creating a single European copyright title, then, as long as the measure is not
manifestly inappropriate to these objectives, the principle of proportionality
will not be violated.
Although a single European copyright title “would require substantial
changes in the way [EU copyright] rules work,”201 nothing short of
unification would sufficiently serve the objectives of providing “uniform
protection of intellectual property rights throughout the Union” and ensuring

196. TEU, supra note 132, at art. 5.
197. Id.
198. Case 11/70, Internationale Handeslgesellschaft mbH v. Einfhur- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide
und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1130.
199. Case C-331/88, The Queen v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Secretary of
State for Health, 1990 E.C.R. I-4023, 4063.
200. TFEU, supra note 78, at arts. 26 and 118.
201. Communication, supra note 1, at 12.

70

CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Vol 17:1

the “functioning of the internal market.”202 As noted above, the optional
nature of Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive allowed Member States to
provide uniform copyright protection by adopting the same exceptions and
limitations, but they did not.203 Member States may also, at any time, engage
in enhanced cooperation to provide uniform copyright protection, but they
have not.204 In any event, participation in enhanced cooperation is voluntary,
so such measures may not provide uniform copyright protection if even one
Member State refuses to participate.205 Measures at the national level,
therefore, are an incredibly unlikely source of uniform copyright protection.
By contrast, the overwhelming success of the Community Trademark
(“CTM”), demonstrates that uniform copyright protection is best achieved
by a single European copyright title.206 Under this system, mark owners may
file a single trademark registration that entitles the mark to uniform
protection in all Member States.207 Although Regulation 40/49 left national
trademark systems intact, these systems have been substantially harmonized
by Directives 2008/95/EC and 2015/2436.208 With over ten directives and
numerous other legislative documents already comprising the EU copyright
framework,209 many claim, “the next logical step in this process towards
uniformity of European copyright law would be the introduction of a truly
unified European Copyright Law.”210
As established above, providing uniform copyright protection and
ensuring the functioning of the internal market are objectives best achieved
at EU, rather than national, level. Of course, the precise mechanics must be
devised by the legislature, but a single European copyright title “would
establish a truly unified legal framework, replacing the multitude of—often
opaque and sometimes conflicting—national rules that presently exists.”211
This would ensure that what is legal in one Member State is not illegal in

202. TFEU, supra note 78, at arts. 26, 118.
203. Guibault et al., supra note 170, at 84-94.
204. See TFEU, supra note 78, at arts. 326-334.
205. See id.
206. Jose Romero & Marcela Dada, supra note 188, at 35.
207. See Council Regulation 207/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 78) 1.
208. See generally Directive 2008/95/EC, 2008 O.J. (L 299) 25; Directive 2015/2436, 2015 O.J. (L
336) 1 (EU).
209. The EU Legal Framework (“Acquis”), EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Oct. 3, 2014),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/acquis/index_en.htm.
210. Hugenholtz, Copyright in Europe: Twenty Years Ago, Today and What the Future Holds, supra
note 181, at 521; see also E.C.S. Letter, supra note 162 (copyright unification “is in fact the logical next
step for the EU legislature to take in this field”).
211. E.C.S. Letter, supra note 162.
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another and thereby achieve the objective of uniform protection of
intellectual property rights.
A single European copyright title would also ensure the functioning of
the internal market by ending the anachronistic application of territoriality to
copyright. Although the European audiovisual industry has maintained that
territoriality is needed to “preserve sustainable financing,” which is generally
“based on territorial licensing combined with the territorial exclusivity
granted to individual distributors or service providers,”212 culture in the
digital age “is not confined to national borders.”213 As such, territoriality has
actually prevented “service providers and distributors from providing crossborder ‘portability’ of services.”214 As the European Copyright Society has
argued, a single European copyright title, then, is “the only way a fully
functioning Digital Single Market,” and therefore a fully functioning internal
market, “can ultimately be achieved.”215 It follows that such a system is not
only proportionate, but also necessary to providing uniform protection and
promoting the internal market. The principle of proportionality, therefore,
would not be offended by a single European copyright title.
In sum, Union, rather than national, level legislation is necessary to
ensure uniform copyright protection and the functioning of the internal
market. Because a single European copyright title would not “exceed what
is necessary” to achieve these objectives, the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality would not be violated.216 Accordingly, the EU legislature
must satisfy its duty to provide uniform copyright protection under Article
118 TFEU by establishing a single European copyright title.
VI.

CONCLUSION

For calling to preserve the freedom of panorama, recognizing
consumers’ rights, and urging of new exceptions and limitations to better fit
the digital age, the Resolution is undoubtedly commendable. Perhaps equally
as laudable is the fact that it served as a catalyst for change, prompting a
proposed regulation on the cross-border portability of online content by the
Commission and a communication outlining its plans to achieve “a more

212. Communication, supra note 1, at 4.
213. Julia Reda, European Culture is Not Confined to National Borders—Let’s Not Use Copyright
to Force it To Be, JULIA REDA (Apr. 3, 2015), https://juliareda.eu/2015/04/european-culture-notconfined-to-national-borders/.
214. Communication, supra note 1, at 4.
215. E.C.S. Letter, supra note 162.
216. TEU, supra note 132, at art. 5; see TFEU, supra note 78, at art. 4.
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modern, more European copyright framework” just six months after it was
released.217
The Resolution and its progeny, however, are not without their
shortcomings. For instance, the Resolution laments geo-blocking as a threat
to the free movement of goods and services, yet affirms the principle of
territoriality, which allows for and encourages geo-blocking.218 What is
worse, this inconsistency was apparently transposed in the Proposal in that
the Proposal similarly denounces geo-blocking yet does not outright ban the
practice.219 Moreover, the Resolution purports to be based on a “high level
of protection” yet calls on the Commission to lower the term of copyright
protection by twenty years.220 Perhaps the most frustrating shortcoming of
the Resolution is Parliament’s vapid request for the Commission to simply
“study the impact of a single European Copyright Title” rather than rallying
the Commission to create one.221 This uninspiring request had a similarly
uninspiring effect, with the Commission merely noting that the EU “should
pursue” a single European copyright title.222
These shortcomings not only confuse the copyright framework, but also
perpetuate the struggles EU copyright law already faces. For example, by
affirming the principle of territoriality, the Resolution and its progeny
continue to fracture the internal market, particularly the digital single market
the Commission is striving to create.223 Furthermore, the Resolution’s note
that “some exceptions and limitations may [] benefit from more common
rules” does not adequately resolve the issues raised by the optional nature of
Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive because differences in copyright protection
could still exist between Member States.224 The existing and inevitable
differences resulting from the Resolution and its progeny with respect to
national copyright regimes contravene the EU legislature’s duty to provide
uniform protection of intellectual property rights under Article 118 TFEU.225
Because a single European copyright is necessary to provide uniform
copyright protection and ensure the functioning of the internal market, the
EU legislature has a duty to establish a single European copyright title.

217. See Communication, supra note 1, at 3; see also Proposal, supra note 8, at 1; Resolution, supra
note 7, at 1.
218. Compare Resolution, supra note 7, at ¶¶ 13 and 17 with ¶¶ 6, 9, 11 and 14.
219. Compare Proposal, supra note 8, at 2 and ¶ 1 with art. 2(c).
220. Compare Resolution, supra note 7, at ¶ 19 with ¶ 32.
221. Id. at ¶ 28.
222. Communication, supra note 1, at 12.
223. See Digital Single Market Strategy, supra note 6, at 3.
224. Resolution, supra note 7, at ¶ 37.
225. TFEU, supra note 78, at art. 118.
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Although a single European copyright title “may be considered
undesirable, or perhaps too drastic, by certain stakeholders and national
legislatures . . . it is in fact the logical next step for the EU legislature to take
in this field.”226 Such a title would afford uniform copyright protection
because there would be just one, EU-wide copyright regime that all Member
States must adhere to, rather than twenty-eight separate ones.227 This, in turn,
would “enhance legal security and transparency” as Europeans would no
longer need to consider a multitude of copyright systems just to make sure
their activities are permissible.228 A single European copyright title would
necessarily entail a central copyright office similar to the Office for
Harmonization in the Internal Market, which manages CTM registrations.229
If a consolidated recording system for transfers of copyright ownership were
included at this copyright office, legal security and transparency would be
even further increased because parties could look at one set of records to
verify the validity of their transfers. In turn, this would “greatly reduce
transaction and enforcement costs.”230 Given the “considerable ‘time,
finance, and other social costs’” associated with incremental harmonization,
a unified system may ultimately cost the EU less than incremental
harmonization by an endless string of directives over the long run.231 A single
European copyright title would also eliminate territoriality with respect to
copyright. This would prohibit the now commonplace yet deleterious
practice of geo-blocking and allow for true cross-border portability of online
content services in the internal market. According to the European Copyright
Society, this is “the only way a fully functioning Digital Single Market” can
be achieved, without which there cannot be truly free movement of goods
and services as required by the internal market.232
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